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NATIONAL POLICY AND THE "PUBLIC INTEREST"
-A MARRIAGE OF NECESSITY IN THE
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934
The Communications Act of 1934 provides that before the Federal
Communications Commission can grant a renewal of a broadcasting license,
the Commission must find that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" will be served thereby.' This is the only standard which the Commission must apply in granting, renewing or modifying licenses, and
2
Congress made no attempt, either in the "definitions" section of the act
or in the legislative history, to establish further guidelines for the construction of the phrase "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Thus it
has been for the FCC and the courts to formulate a reasonable definition.
No concrete definition has ever been formulated.
The first significant case to comment on the "public interest" standard,
FederalRadio Comm"n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co.,3 stated that
the standard is not so indefinite as to grant the Commission an unlimited
power.4 Nonetheless, it is unclear what restraints the courts have placed
on the power of the Commission.

In McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,5

Judge Miller stated that the standard does not lend itself to a "precise or
comprehensive definition." 6 He went on to say that the only restrictions
the court would place on the Commission were that the Commission must
act neither arbitrarily nor capriciously and that it must act within statutory
and constitutional bounds. 7 That an agency must act within constitutional
limits is obvious. For a court to say that the Commission must be neither
arbitrary nor capricious and that it must act within statutory bounds is not
particularly illuminating.
The District of Columbia Circuit was not always so vague. In
WOKO, Inc. v. FCC,s which preceded McClatchy by some ten years, the
148 Stat 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. §309(a) (1964).
248 Stat. 1065 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
3289 U.S. 266 (1933). Nelson was decided under the Federal Radio Act, from
which the "public interest" standard was adopted. S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6-7 (1934).

4289 U.S. at 285; accord, Yankee Network, Inc. v. FCC, 107 F.2d 212, 219
(D.C. Cir. 1939); Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 105 F.2d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir.

1939), rev'd on other grounds, 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
5239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 918 (1957).
1d. at 18. This language is typical of that found in "public interest" cases. See,
e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (Franldurter, J.);
American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
7 239 F.2d at 18.
8 153 F2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
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court overruled an FCC holding that because of a misstatement made in the
station's application a renewal of WOKO's license would not be in the
"public interest." The court felt that the FCC had abused its discretion,
deeming the misstatement not so significant as to disqualify the applicant
under the "public interest" standard. The Commission appealed to the
Supreme Court, which reversed.9 The FCC's primary argument before
the Court was that "a 'sensible exercise' of administrative judgment in
applying statutory criteria of such breadth is to be left undisturbed.
S."

10

Agreeing, the Supreme Court held that there had been no abuse

of discretion and that it was for the Commission rather than the courts to
be satisfied that the granting of a renewal would be in the "public
interest." 11
Thus for the most part "public interest" is an undefined and undefinable phrase and the FCC can interpret the standard as it pleases. Perhaps
for the mine run of cases, this is as it should be, since it allows the Commission to bring its expertise and experience to bear on the facts of each
particular case.' 2 The reasons generally advanced for leaving this kind of
definition to the expertise and experience of the Commission are that the
Commission has greater knowledge of the area and is more specialized in
These considerations do not apply,
treating the problems that arise.'i
however, when a national policy has been clearly enunciated either by Congress or the courts-when either has prescribed unequivocally a course of
action for the nation to follow. Since in such instances no expertise is
necessary,' 4 the courts should make specific demands of the Commission.
That national policy is relevant to any consideration of "public interest" was first expressed in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States.15
Conflicting national policies bore on that case, as the Interstate Commerce
Act authorized the ICC to approve mergers that "will be consistent with
the public interest" 16 and yet as a general rule, mergers were disfavored
by the anti-trust laws. The Supreme Court held that the anti-trust laws
should be a consideration, weighed in light of the overall transportation
17
policy.
) FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
10 Brief for Appellant, p. 40, FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
"1Id. at 229; see Harbenito Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 218 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C.
Cir. 1954).
12 See, e.g., FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940) ; American
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
13 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944);
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941).
'4 See James S. Rivers, Inc. (WJAZ) v. FCC, 351 F.2d 194, 198 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) ; cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
15 321 U.S. 67 (1944). In this case, the phrase "public interest" was contained
in § 7 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 906 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§5(2) (b) (1964).
1654 Stat 906 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (b) (1964).
17 321 U.S. at 87.
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The relationship between national policy and "public interest" was
also the primary issue in FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc.,'5 in which

the FCC allowed Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company to compete with
RCA in the sphere of international communications. The Commission
stated that it had an affirmative duty to consider the national policy favoring competition. 19 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the FCC
had not found that any benefits would accrue to the public from the granting of the modification. 20 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
court of appeals and remanded the case to that court with instructions to
remand to the Commission for further consideration.21 The chief reason
for the Supreme Court's decision seems to have been that the Commission
22
was misguided in finding a national policy favoring competition.

It is

implicit in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, nonetheless, that if the Court
had felt that there was 23such a national policy, the decision of the FCC

would have been upheld.

National policy is therefore a relevant consideration in determining
the "public interest." That this is not enough-that national policy should
not be merely relevant but rather controlling when that policy is clearly
enunciated and critically important-is suggested by consideration of the
recent FCC decision in Lamar Life Broadcasting Co.24
In Lamar, a Jackson, Mississippi, television station applied for renewal
of its license. The United Church of Christ filed a petition to deny the
renewal. The Commission noted, consistent with its past holdings, that
United Church did not have standing before it. Also consistent with its
past procedure, however, the Commission stated that it would consider the
points raised by United Church's petition. 25 In its petition United Church
alleged 26 that the station, WLBT, had been attempting to frustrate the
national policy favoring racial equality.2 7

Moreover the FCC found upon

its own investigation that WLBT had broadcast prosegregation editorials
18 346 U.S. 86 (1953).

19 Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 5 Radio Reg. 561, 583 (FCC 1951).
20 RCA Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.2d 694, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
21 FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 98 (1953).
22 Id. at 96. Mr. Justice Frankfurter said that "the conclusion [that the granting
of a modification would be in the public interest] was not based on the Commission's
own judgment but rather on the unjustified assumption that it was Congress' judgment that such authorizations are desirable. .. ."
23 On remand, the Commission arrived at the same decision it had previously
reached, but without the aid of the national policy formulation. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 8 Radio Reg. 1174 (FCC 1955). This time the court of appeals affirmed.
RCA Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also Mansfield Journal Co. (FM) v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
2438 F.C.C. 1143 (1965).
25Id. at 1149.
261d. at 1148-53. This was not the first time such allegations had been made
against WLBT. See Lamar Life Ins. Co., 18 Radio Reg. 683 (FCC 1959).
27 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Civil Rights Act

of 1957, 71 Stat. 637, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964) ; Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243,
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
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28
while refusing equal time to those espousing the integrationist viewpoint,
29
conduct which would seem to violate the Commission's fairness doctrine.
Over and above any violation of the fairness doctrine, however, such conduct would seem to be a frustration of national policy. 30 In spite of these
allegations, the Commission granted a renewal of WLBT's license for a
one year period, rather than the usual three, saying only that while serious
questions were presented, it would be in the "public interest" to renew the
license.31 Nowhere in the opinion did the Commission discuss national
policy; rather, it restricted itself to consideration of the fairness doctrine

and to the question whether or not WLBT served the needs and interests
of the community. 32
Thus while the Commission made no findings on the United Church
petition,as it did make independent findings that the station did not afford
equal time to integrationists. The frustration of national policy by the
station is certainly a factor which the Commission should have discussed
before granting a renewal.34 Moreover, in a case such as Lamar where
2838

F.C.C. at 1146-47.

The findings which the Commission deemed particularly significant were:
(i) In the Fall of 1962, the station broadcast a series of editorials
opposing the enrollment of James Meredith at the University of Mississippi.
(ii) In 1962-1963, WLBT broadcast a program series entitled "Comment"
which . . . discussed the issue of racial integration [from a segregationist's
viewpoint] on various occasions.
(iii) In September of 1962 [WLBT] . . . presented a series of spot
announcements paid for by the Jackson Citizens' Council. These spots
showed newspaper clippings with the announcement that "You're seeing
published proof that the Communists are behind the racial agitation now
going on in Mississippi," and that "every white man and woman in Mississippi
should be a Citizens' Council member" in order "to protect your family from
these Communist-led integration attempts."
(iv) WLBT broadcast a program in which Tougaloo College, which is
closely identified with the civil rights movement in Mississippi, was also
accused of being Communist-infiltrated.
Id. at 1146-47. (Footnote omitted.)
29 See, e.g., Evening News Ass'n (WWJ), 6 Radio Reg. 283 (FCC 1950) ; New
Broadcasting Co. (W'LIB), 6 Radio Reg. 258 (FCC 1950). See generally Barron, The
Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEo.
WAs H. L. REv. 1 (1961).
30
On the other hand, a denial of equal time to segregationists might constitute
a violation of the fairness doctrine, but still not be a frustration of national policy.
3138 F.C.C. at 1154.
32 Id. at 1154-55. While United Church framed its petition in these terms, id.
at 1148-53, questions of national policy seem implicit therein. Moreover, even if such
questions were not implicit, it would seem that an agency charged with finding the
"public interest" should not disregard them. This should be distinguished from the
situation where issues are not explicitly raised before a court, and the court should
decide only the questions before it. See MISHKiN & MoRRis, ON LAW IN CouRTs
146 (1965).
33 This failure is itself an abuse of discretion. The Commission stated that the
United Church petition raised serious "public interest" questions. 38 F.C.C. at 1154.
To make no findings under these conditions seems to be clearly erroneous. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Hudson Valley Broadcasting Corp. v.
FCC, 320 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Missouri Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 94 F.2d
623 (D.C. Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 655 (1938); 74 Stat. 891 (1960), 47
U.S.C. §309(e) (1964).
4See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86 (1953); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
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the national policy is clear and does not conflict with any other such
policy, 35 any frustration or attempted frustration of the national policy
should result in denial of the application. The severe sanction of denial
is justified by the nature of the offense committed by the station. Knowing
violation 33 of a clearly enunciated national policy is the most serious offense
that a licensee qua licensee can commit. Surely a licensee who has so
conducted himself has not acted in the "public interest." Thus if the
Commission makes the permissible inference that one who has knowingly
violated the "public interest" standard in the past would continue to do so
in the future,3 7 WLBT's license could not be renewed. Moreover, given
both the serious and repeated nature of WLBT's violations, perhaps the
inference should not be merely permissible but rather mandatory. It is
one thing to give a station another chance when it has failed to meet the
"public interest" by playing too much "rock 'n' roll"; it is quite another
matter to give the station another chance when it has repeatedly violated
a national policy of critical importance.
Even if the inference is not mandatory and the FCC chooses not to
make it, it is at least arguable that the licensee should be punished for past
conduct. In FCC v. WOKO, Inc.,3a the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's denial of a renewal where the licensee had made a misstatement in
its application. No inference was made as to the ability of the licensee to
serve the "public interest" in the future. Lamar presents a much stronger
case for punitive action on the part of FCC than did WOKO.3 9
Action in accordance with the position that national policy, when unambiguous and of critical importance, is coterminous with "public interest"
85 Compare Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965), with McLean
Trucking Co. v. United States, .upra note 34, where there were conflicting policies.
See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
36 It is impossible to imagine that WLBT did not know that there was a national
policy favoring racial equality or that it did not know that it was violating this
standard, at least in those instances in which the Commission found discrimination.
See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
37 See, e.g., Greater Kampeska Radio Corp. v. FCC, 108 F.2d 5 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933); KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio
Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931); 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C.
§ 308(b) (1964).
38 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
30 Cf. 48 Stat. 1086 (1952), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1964).
There is no doubt that were the District of Columbia Circuit to set up a per se
rule that any violation of a clearly defined and critically important national policy
would necessitate denial of an application for renewal, it would disregard the traditional doctrine of agency discretion which holds that the question whether or not
a renewal would be in the "public interest" is to be made by the FCC after weighing
all the evidence. FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946). This disregard seems
necessary both because of the serious nature of the violation and the great impact
which the use of mass media probably lent it.
An alternative solution would be for the FCC itself to formulate a per se rule
whereby it would renew no licenses when it found facts which constitute a violation
of an unambiguous and crucial national policy. This solution would involve no
usurpation of agency discretion by the courts; but the FCC may not be willing to
f9rmulate such a rule,
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would depart from the Commission's policy favoring renewal. 40 This
policy is predicated on a concern for the severe economic loss that would
almost surely follow the denial of an application for renewal. 41 It seems,
however, that where a licensee chooses to violate such a national policy,
he must be held willing to bear the risk of economic loss.
Although United Church has taken an appeal from the Commission's
decision,42 it is doubtful whether, under present standards, that appeal will
be heard on the merits. The right to appeal a decision and order of the
FCC, which is analogous to having standing before the Commission, 43 is
provided by sections 402(b) (2) and 402(b) (6) of the Communications
Act. The crux of these subsections is that "any person .

. aggrieved"

by a Commission order has the right to appeal. 44 In FCC v. Sanders Bros.
Radio Station,45 Mr. Justice Roberts stated that potential economic injury
is a sufficient ground to make one a "person aggrieved."

40

While no

40 This policy is best exemplified by Thomas S. Lee Enterprises, Inc., 5 Radio
Reg. 1179 (FCC 1949). In Lee, the Commission found a violation of its rules but
admitted that it was reluctant to deny the application for renewal. Its reasoning was
that such a denial is the equivalent of the "death sentence." Id. at 1200.
41 See Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC, 160 F.2d 244, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
The
economic loss would be caused by the licensee's being left with a used broadcasting
station. Any prospective purchaser of the station's equipment would realize that the
former licensee had no use for the equipment itself and would adjust his price accordingly.
42
Appeal docketed, No. 19,409, D.C. Cir., June 10, 1965.
43A person has standing before the Commission when he is a "party in interest'
as that phrase is used in § 309(d) (1) of the Communications Act of 1934, 74 Stat.
890 (1960), 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1) (1964). Section 309(d) (1) reads, in part:
Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to deny
any application . . . . The petition shall contain specific allegations of fact
sufficient to show that the petitioner is a party in interest and that a grant of
the application would be prima facie inconsistent with subsection (a) [which
requires that in granting or renewing licenses the Commission must find that
"the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served"] of this
section ...
4466 Stat 718 (1952), 47 U.S.C. §§402(b) (2), (6) (1964).
More completely,
these subsections provide:
(b) Appeals may be taken from decisions and orders of the Commission to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in any of the
following cases:

(2) By any applicant for the renewal or modification of any such
instrument of authorization whose application is denied by the Commission.
(6) By any other person who is aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected by any order of the Commission granting or
denying any application described in paragraphs (1)-(4) of this
subsection.
45 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
46 Id. at 477. This is basically the definition applied by the courts today. See,
e.g., Southwestern Publishing Co. v. FCC, 243 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir.. 1955).
The Metropolitan case applies the definition in a roundabout way by saying that
a "person aggrieved" is a "party in interest" as that term is used in § 309 of the act.
221 F.2d at 880. Likelihood of economic injury has been held sufficient by the courts
to make one a "party in interest" See, e.g., Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 323
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subsequent case has held that likelihood of economic injury is a sine qua
non to being a "person aggrieved," no one has ever been held a "person
aggrieved" without such a showing. On the contrary, at least one case,
National Anti-Vivisection Soc'y v. FCC,47 implies that such a showing
is necessary. There the plaintiff applied to the district court for a writ
of mandamus ordering the Commission either to conduct a hearing and
revoke the license of WCIV, a Chicago station which had been broadcasting bullfights, or to issue a cease and desist order. In denying plaintiff's requests, Judge Robson stated that he doubted whether the society
had standing to appeal under section 402(b), noting that being a "vanguard" for interests which need protection does not, in itself, provide
48
inclusion as a "person aggrieved."
The FCC's handling of the "party in interest" standard"4 is strikingly
similar to the courts' treatment of the "person aggrieved" standard. The
Commission has gone one step further than the courts, however, and has
held that likelihood of economic injury is not only sufficient but also necessary to make one a "party in interest." SO In passing on the validity of the
Commission's standard, the courts have agreed that a showing of potential
economic injury is sufficient to make a person a "party in interest."5 1 As
in the "person aggrieved" cases, however, no court has ever found a person
to be a "party in interest" without a showing of potential economic injury.
The legislative history of the act 52 does not reveal the authority under
which the courts and the Commission have so limited the two standards
nor have the cases pointed out the reasons why they have done so. One
reason might be to eliminate vexatious suits; another might be to prevent
the "flood of litigation" that could arise if no limitations were placed on
those having standing before the Commission and the right to appeal from
F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d
539 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Camden Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
47234 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
48 Id. at 697.
49 See note 43 supra.
SI Gordon Broadcasting, Inc., 22 Radio Reg. 236 (FCC 1962) ; Cherry & Webb
Broadcasting Co., 10 Radio Reg. 181 (FCC 1954).
53 See, e.g., Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 323 F.2d 797 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 286 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Interstate Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 285 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Philco Corp. v. FCC,
257 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 946 (1959); Camden Radio,
Inc. v. FCC, 220 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
52 The legislative history of the "party in interest" standard, S. REP. No. 44,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951), does provide:
Fear has been expressed that use of "parties in interest" might make possible intervention into proceedings by a host of parties who have no legitimate interest but solely with the purpose of delaying license grants which
should be made. The committee does not so construe the term "party in
interest"; . . . "parties in interest" from an economic standpoint are defined
by the Supreme Court decision in the Sanders case. ...
See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra. Sanders, however, merely held that economic interest was sufficient to make one a "person aggrieved." Thus the legislative
history is not dispositive.
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its decisions. Whatever the reason, the present application of the standards leaves persons with matters of critical importance to raise who will be
heard only at the discretion of the FCC, 53 and who have no right to appeal
the Commission's decision.54
These standards are especially anomalous in light of the implication
in the District of Columbia Circuit's recent opinion in James S. Rivers, Inc.
(WJAZ) v. FCC 55 that the court had a broader than usual scope of review
in cases involving racial discrimination. The issue before the court in
Rivers was the validity of the Commission's refusal to waive its "ten percent
rule." 56 WJAZ, which was already authorized to operate an AM station
during daytime hours, petitioned the FCC for authority to broadcast at
night as well. The Commission denied the petition, stating that the proposed service would fail to reach the required ninety percent of the population in the service area. One of the reasons that WJAZ had urged in favor
of waiver in this situation was that it was superior to the other stations
in the community in serving the needs and interest of the Negroes in the
service area. This contention was dismissed by the FCC. While the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the FCC's decision, the majority opinion
implied and Chief Judge Bazelon explicitly stated in his concurring opinion
that the court had a wider scope of review on this kind of question than in
the more technical questions which the Commission must decide.57
Unlike the station in Rivers, however, most parties alleging racial
inequality will not be able to show any likelihood of economic injury and
thus under present standards would not have standing before the Commission nor the right to appeal from an FCC decision. If these standards
are allowed to continue, the language of the court in Rivers concerning a
broader scope of review in cases of racial discrimination would go for
naught, as the court would only hear cases of alleged discrimination if the
broadcaster chose to appeal the FCC decision. This is not likely if the
Commission's disposition of the issue in Lamar is indicative of the treatment to be afforded those who deny racial equality.
Thus both the "party in interest" and "person aggrieved" standards
are in need of revision. An exception should be carved into the economic
injury test where the appellant would raise questions of national policy.
53 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
54 See 68 YALE L.J. 783 (1959).

55 351 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
5647 C.F.R. § 73.28(d) (3)

(1965). This rule provides that inability of proposed
service to reach at least 90% of the population in a service area renders that proposed
service unacceptable.
57

Chief Judge Bazelon stated that:

[O]n the question of discrimination in program content, the Commission's
expertise is at least no greater than ours and no question of regulatory policy
is involved in deciding whether or not the facts presented constitute dis-

crimination. Also, we have no difficulty in analyzing the underlying facts
as the court's close scrutiny of the record on this issue clearly demonstrates.
It follows that our scope of review here is correspondingly wider [than in
the more technical questions] . ...
351 F.2d at 198.
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While this exception could be limited somewhat by denying all subsequent
petitions once one which adequately represents the interests of all petitioners is received, 58 there is no doubt that a consequence of this revision
would be an increase in the number of cases which the FCC and the District of Columbia Circuit would have to hear. Such a result would be
justified, however, by a full airing of these crucial questions of national
policy.
58 See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs

of the class action in the federal courts.

§ 72 (1963), which discusses the use

